Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia
by Ahmed Rashid

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Book Reviews of Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia

Book Review: complete economic, military, religious, and political survey
Summary: 5 Stars

Rashid writes about the full cast of actors in Afghanistan as he considers economic, military, religious, and political aspects of the country. There are large numbers of factions among the Pashtun and Hazara. It has been an explicit matter of policy for Pakistan (initially funding many Pashtun factions before settling on the Taliban) and Iran (funding eight different Hazara factions) to promote that factionalization.

Rashid describes typical Islamic practice in Afghanistan and how it has grown harsher since 1973. Traditionally moderate in its Islamic practice, 90% of Afghans belong to the Sunni Hanafi school, the most liberal of the four main schools of Islamic thought. Further moderating its tolerance and practice was the enormous popularity of Sufism, especially the Naqshbandiyah and Qaderiyah schools. CIA, ISI, and Saudi support for the fringes of Afghani Muslim practice to the detriment of the moderate mainstream started with the Mujaheddin in 1980, and has as a result shattered the strength of the mainstream.

He clearly recounts the shallowness of US policy, the self-destructive nature of Pakistani and Saudi policy, and the incredible machinations and betrayals by non-Muslim of Muslim as well as Muslim by Muslim. The hyper-conservative Wahabbi Islam and Pashtun natures of the Taliban are depicted as consequences of its Saudi-Pakistani support, given the Wahabbi ties to the Saudi monarchy and the large Pashtun community in Pakistan. During the Soviet occupation, the US committed some four to five billion dollars between 1980 and 1992 in aid to the Mujaheddin. US funds were matched by Saudi Arabia. Most of this aid was in the form of weapons. After the Soviets left, the US lost interest in the area and the Afghans as well as the Pakistanis were left to pick up the pieces as best they could. By 1994 this meant that, as now, Ismael Khan was in the NW near Herat, Dostum was in the north at Mazar, Rabbani (with the late Massoud) were in the NE, and (unlike now) southern Afghanistan was divided up amongst dozens of ex-Mujaheddin warlords.

"Some 20 percent of the Pakistani was made up of Pakistani Pashtuns and the pro-Pashtun and Islamic fundamentalist lobby within [Pakistan's] ISI and the military remained determined to achieve a Pashtun victory in Afghanistan. However, by 1994 Hikmetyar had clearly failed... Pakistan was getting tired of backing a loser and was looking around for other potential Pashtun proxies." The Taliban's support for Jihad in Kashmir cemented their ties to Pakistan, while giving Pakistan plausible deniability. By 1995 the Saudis were underwriting Pakistani efforts to aid the Taliban. "After the end of the Cold War, Washington's policy to [the area] was stymied by a lack of a strategic framework. [It] dealt with issues as they came up, in a haphazard, piecemeal fashion... Between 1994 and 1996 the USA supported the Taliban politically through its allies Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, essentially because Washington viewed the Taliban as anti-Iranian, anti-Shia and pro-Western." The US ignored the Taliban's fundamentalism. From 1995 to 1997 a Unocal-sponsored pipeline and oil field development plan enhanced US support. Subsequently domestic pressure over women's rights, hosting bin Laden, and drug production have progressively soured US disposition towards the Taliban without motivating an interest in fostering peace or development.

An especially striking case of betrayal is recounted in the 1997-1998 battle for Mazar-e-Sharif. Rashid Dostum was in command at the time. He got his position in part by betraying his mentor, then-President Najibullah, who has been installed by the Soviets on their way out. Dostum's second-in-command, Malik Pahlawan, betrayed Dostum in May 19, 1997 to the Taliban. The Taliban came in and, with Malik's help (and the fact that Dostum hadn't paid his troops for five months), took the city. Dostum fled Uzbekistan then to Turkey. Malik also turned over Ismael Khan to them. On May 28, 1997 there was an uprising against the Taliban in which some 600 Taliban were massacred in the streets. Malik was now in full control of four provinces. But in September the Taliban counterattacked, Dostum returned from Turkey and defeated Malik, who fled to Turkmenistan. All this infighting among the Uzbeks and the other members of the alliance made it easier for the Taliban to return the next year and alternatively beat and buy off the various factions and retake Mazar, after which they massacred inhabitants, especially Hazara, for two days.

The author, himself Pakistani, writes accessible English and draws from over 20 years of experience as a journalist covering Afghanistan. His first-person accounts of the major players on Taliban and anti-Taliban sides, as well as with parties in neighboring countries, adds to the depth of this book. On Mullah Omar: "A tall well-built man with a long, black beard and a black turban, Omar has a dry sense of humor and a sarcastic wit... His shyness makes him a poor public speaker and despite the mythology that now surrounds him, he has little charismatic appeal. Some Taliban say Omar was chosen for as their leader not for his political or military ability, but for his piety and his unswerving faith in Islam."

The transport Mafia; the destabilization of Pakistan; and the smuggling revenues that the Taliban taxes for its main income have also played their part in the tragedy that has made Afghanistan, like Somalia and so much of West and Central Africa, a failed state. Brief appearances by Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig working on behalf of oil companies, trying to secure oil franchises and rights to build pipelines and drill for oil. give this book a little bit of everything for students (Taliban - sorry, couldn't resist the pun) of current events who want a deeper insight into Central and South Asia and the Islamic world, and the outsiders who meddle there.

Summary of Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia

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