State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III by Bob Woodward
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Book Reviews of State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III
Book Review: State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III
Summary: 4 Stars
How quickly history moves sometimes. As I write this review, George W. Bush has been out of office just past one hundred days. Already, the war in Iraq is quickly fading from the front pages. The arguments have gone from whether or not to withdraw troops to whether or not to prosecute some of the people involved in the conduct of "the war on terror."
Like Bob Woodward's former books on Bush and the war, this makes excellent reading. It is as free from bias as anyone could write in the circumstances. Everyone has a different take on what went right and what went wrong regarding Iraq. How readers see this book will be greatly influenced by the viewpoint they bring to the table.
That said, unless you are firmly set far to one side or the other of the subject, this book will surprise you. If you expect it to "bash Bush," it does not. Nor does it excuse him. Bush comes across as ill prepared for the job of leading. He bowed to the judgment of others and then made the mistake of defending the direction they took him. Admittedly, you won't find many "good guys" in this story and unless you have been a student of the war, you may not recognize the names of those cast in the most favorable light. Those with well-publicized names do not come off very well. In fact, people are so familiar with the names of those players that I am going to dispense with their first names.
Rumsfeld and the officers who served as Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs during the Bush administration come across as misleading the President, obstructing any efforts to change the direction Rumsfeld took the Pentagon, and failing to admit mistakes made. Chaney appears as a mysterious figure who wielded great power until late in Bush's second term. He seemed to lose that grip on things when "Scooter" Libby, his second in command, was indicted in the CIA leak case. Others in the administration - Rove and Wolfowitz for example - had their own agendas which Bush and Chaney often followed without anyone acting as a check on their influence.
Rice and Powell are special cases that come across with both high marks and serious negatives. Powell and his close associate Richard Armitage are credited with having a clearer vision of world affairs than other advisors to the President. Unfortunately, their advice was too often ignored or overruled. In the case of Powell, he acquiesced too easily in decisions that he sincerely doubted.
Anyone questioning the intelligence of the people who make it into the top echelons in our government is making a mistake. However, Rice's knowledge and skill stand out. She understood the workings of the government and the roles she played better than most. She was a loyal lieutenant to the President and during his first term was both an access point and conduit by which to reach the President. As National Security Advisor to the President, she wielded considerable additional power. In fact, she was such a key player that it spread her energies pretty thin while also threatening to compromise her role of palace guard. This changed after she became Secretary of State and she served the country well in that role despite whatever baggage she may have been carrying from Bush's first term.
Two other players are mentioned throughout the book but their influence on the President is unclear. The former President, George H. W. Bush, deliberately avoided having undue influence or conflict with his son. He was a loyal supporter as a father, but not an advisor. The second person is Prince Bandar bin Sultan, longtime Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States and a longtime friend of the Bush family. He advised George W. Bush during the campaign for his first term. Both then and throughout the two terms of the second Bush administration, Bandar provided the President insight into the Arab world, as well as Saudi policy.
There are a multitude of other players from the Administration, the Pentagon, Iraq, Congress, and from outside of government. Woodward is adept at trying to keep the players straight. He fails only occasionally as the story shifts between locations, times, and centers of power. Overall, this is an excellent journalistic effort. When released, it was good reading on current events. Now, it is still that but is rapidly becoming good history as well. It is, of course, only a beginning of that history. New revelations about the Bush administration and the Iraq war are surfacing at an ever increasing rate. One wonders if Woodward will write a Part IV of his series. Undoubtedly, many others will write their own versions.
Book Review: A Cautionary Tale
Summary: 4 Stars
The most recent addition to our understanding of our difficulties in Iraq, State of Denial by Watergate reporter Bob Woodward deals less with military insights and operations than with the conflicts and tensions among the personalities involved. Though lacking the tactical insights that make books such as Cobra II and Fiasco such alarming works, Woodward's gifts as an interviewer lets him paint a portrait of an Administration largely trapped by its rhetoric, and held prisoner to its own unchallenged assumptions. Confronting the tragedy of the September 11th attacks, the new Bush Administration moved quickly and resolutely to the offensive, determined to confront and destroy those whose hatred of the West led them to murder innocents on American soil.
Old Scores to Settle
Though blessed with an abundance of technical, military, and human resources--including a presidential father with a gift for diplomacy and a secretary of state who was respected and admired throughout the world--the Bush Administration soon turned, as if by instinct, toward an old enemy. Iraq, though it had not participated in the 9/11 attacks, was still unfinished business as far as some top-level aides and policy makers in the Administration were concerned. And once the dust had settled, and we had dispatched the Taliban from Afghanistan, eyes turned to settle scores with Saddam, whose sympathies were clearly with those who wish this country harm.
The Roots of Our Problems
Certainly, no one can waste much sympathy on the old Iraqi dictator. Saddam was a brutal ruler, inflicting death and torture on his enemies and heading a regime that survived by brute force and fear. But Woodward's account suggests that by creating a system which punished the expression of contrary points of view, and equated misgivings with disloyalty, the Bush Administration was setting itself up for a disaster at some point during its term of office. When coupled with a secretary of defense who insisted on making all important decisions himself, and who dismissed or ridiculed any non-conforming points of view, the nation was at high risk that the disaster would take a military form. Add what appears to be a world view based on personal or political loyalty rather than objective fact, and a defense secretary unwilling to consider the suggestion that Iraq could become another Vietnam, and the result is an unending chain of bad decisions, culminating in our current predicament.
State of Denial will not add to the reader's understanding of what has gone wrong in Iraq from a military standpoint. It contains little military history or analysis, and struggles to place the events in their historical context. Its strength lies in Woodward's tenacity as an interviewer, and his unparalleled access to official Washington. The book is at its best when unraveling the inner workings of governmental insiders. Unfortunately, the view it gives of our government is not for the faint of heart. It is often said that watching laws and sausage being made often causes the viewer to lose his appetite for either. But watching our government setting its course for Iraq is like watching a fatal crash in slow motion: we are helpless to change things, even if we cannot keep from watching in morbid fascination.
Book Review: Good not Great
Summary: 4 Stars
I read this book in August 2010 to figure out what went right, what went wrong, and what should have been done differently during the Iraq invasion. I tried to have a more structural and dispassionate perspective six years after the invasion.
Full disclosure, before reading this book I believed that the invasion of Iraq was the right decision, we needed more troops, and that we simply had no exist strategy while invading.
Woodward's book revealed a much deeper level of bureaucratic warfare and poor planning than I imagined. I still believe the Iraqi invasion was the correct decision. However, this book stands as a good account of the structural weak points (or positions that have been misused)in the current NSC structure as the US has expanded its leadership after the Cold War.
Book Review: Chock full of facts, but what does it all mean?
Summary: 2 Stars
Only Bob Woodward can get away with a book like this. A first-year history graduate student would have a manuscript like this returned for a complete rewrite.
First, there is no table of contents, but that is only a reflection of a much larger problem with "State of Denial." Aside from the audacious title, there is little if any analysis in this book that purports to show an Administration blindly pursuing a strategy that, for anyone with even a modest understanding of the Middle East, was doomed from the outset. This is well-trodden territory.
So what does Mr. Woodward provide that is new? Much is made of a July 10, 2001 meeting at which CIA director George Tenet supposedly warned then-National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice that an Al-Qaeda attack in the U.S. appeared imminent. This meeting was not mentioned in the various post 9/11 investigations, so Woodward has a nice scoop here. But the information is merely incremental, as we know from many hearings and reports that the Administration didn't heed numerous warnings of an impending attack.
A big problem with this book, and, sadly, with most books written by journalists, is its lack of scholarly discipline. The sourcing is largely a series of "knowledgeable sources," on-the-record interviews by Woodward and newspaper articles. Anyone but Woodward would have to do better. The author is basically saying: "I'm Bob Woodward, the guy who helped bring down a presidency, so just trust me."
Also troubling is the lack of any meaningful organization. The book proceeds largely chronologically, with no thematic or topical structure. Chapters simply have numbers. Here is where Woodward really shows his limitations: He's brilliant at gathering information, but not very good at interpreting it, putting it in context, giving the reader an understanding of the bigger picture. Instead we are bombarded with quotes, many of them superfluous or self-serving, and recollections of various meetings and conversations.
"State of Denial" is a 491-page string of anecdotes. But anecdotes are only as good as the theme they are meant to illustrate. "State of Denial" never really gives us that theme. Is it not a cop-out to say a reporter's duty is to just present the facts? This book cries out for a thorough editing and a co-writer who can deliver the thinking that Mr. Woodward, at best, is unwilling to display, or, at worst, does not have.
Book Review: Bob Woodward Care Little for National Security
Summary: 1 Stars
Bob Woodward, in his attempt to make the Best Seller's list, completely disregards our national security and Department of Defense laws concerning classification of documents and information, which if released to the public, could cause untold damage to our country and/or human life. This does not appear to bother Mr. Woodward in his, yet another, attempt to become a billionare.