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How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic Calamities by John Cassidy
Book Summary InformationAuthor: John Cassidy Edition: Hardcover Audio: English (Unknown); English (Original Language); English (Published) Published: 2009-11-10 ISBN: 0374173206 Number of pages: 400 Publisher: Farrar, Straus and Giroux
Book Reviews of How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic CalamitiesBook Review: Smith and Keynes versus Friedman and Hayek Summary: 5 Stars
The author has done a very good job in showing that financial markets are characterized by and subject to decision making under conditions of uncertainty,ambiguity ,ignorance and Mandelbrot's "wild " risk of the Cauchy Distribution.The libertarian economics of Friedman and Hayek can't deal with this type of decision making.Friedman and Hayek can only deal with markets that can be characterized as risky.This is why Friedman always assumed a normal( log normal )probability distribution ,which Mandelbrot correctly characterized as exhibiting " mild " risk at best.This type of analysis lies at the heart of the failed VAR modeling(p.272) that the banking industry used to analyze and minimize the risk of their own highly speculative ,leveraged financial portfolios .Hayek's writings contain a lot of "Talk" about uncertainty. This kind of "Talk" can be found in the writings of all libertarian writers,from Menger and L von Mises to Hayek and Kirzner.Unfortunately,none of them ever discuss the process or ways that decision makers use in order to cope , deal,and overcome conditions of uncertainty/ambiguity/ignorance . These authors postulate some type of miraculous,spontaneously generated magic of the marketplace solution that turns out to be identical to the equilibrium solution arrived at by Friedman based on his assumption of a log normal -normal probability distribution for allmarkets.Incredibily,Friedman,nor any other libertatian economist,ever presented any goodness of fit tests or exploratory data analysis of th etime series data before thay assumed normality. This approach is completely anti scientific.
None of the above mentioned libertarian economists can deal with the overwhelming empirical and experimental evidence that entrepreneurs are ambiguity averse(p.202). The author is correct that the original analysis of ambiguity aversion is contained in the A Treatise on Probability (TP,1921).However,he fails to mention where this occurs.It occurs in chapter 6 and then,in a much more powerful form ,in chapter 26 when Keynes specifies his conventional coefficient of risk and weight ,c,where ambiguity,uncertainty and ignorance are inverse functions of Keynes's weight of the evidence variable ,w,where w is defined on the unit interval [0,1] .I will append an exposition of the c coefficient at the end of my review demonstrating how both Hayek's and Friedman 's positions are very special cases of Keynes's general case.
The author also does an excellent job in showing how Hayek , Friedman and other libertarian economists ,like Greenspan and Stigler, tried to cover up Adam Smith's analysis of money and banking because Smith's analysis is practically identical to the analysis and policy proposals put forth by Keynes in the General Theory on pp.321-327,338-353,and 371-377.Smith correctly focused on the private banking system as the major source of instability and bubble making in the modern ,capitalist economy.Smith made it clear that the main purpose of a central bank is to prevent the projectors,imprudent risk takers,and prodigals( Keynes's speculators and rentiers),like Madoff, Michael Milken,Ivan Boesky, Charles Keating,LTCM,hedge funds,etc.,from getting loans and lines of credit from the commercial and investment bankers because the savings of the depositors would be "...wasted and destroyed... " to use Adam Smith's characterization.
I recommend this book .
Keynes presented a clearcut mathematical,technical analysis of ambiguity aversion using his conventional coefficient of risk and and weight( uncertainty),c,in chapter 26 of the TP. A very specific example of Keynes's nomlinear and non additive approach to probability in chapters 15,17,20,and 22 of the TP was worked out in great detail by Keynes in chapter 26 using his conventional coefficient of risk and weight ,c, on p.314 and in Footnote 2 on p.314.Edgeworth, in his 1922 article on " The Philosophy of Chance " in Mind ,was certainly correct in asking for the help of the readers of that philosophy journal in order to figure out the what and the why's involved in the application of Keynes's c coefficient.This will be provided for the reader below since it was never done in Mind or anywhere else with the exception of Brady's work.
The foundation of Neoclassical economics is merely the mathematical development of a theoretical approach first proposed by Jeremy Bentham in 1787.Bentham claimed that all individuals have the capability to calculate the odds and outcomes and act on the expected value (the probability times the outcome) in a rational way.This can be expressed by the following ,where p is the probability of success and A is the outcome:
Maximize pA.
The modern version of this is to Maximize pU(A),where p is a subjective probability that is additive,linear,precise,and exact.U(A) is a Von Neumannn-Morgenstern Utility function.The goal is to
Maximize pU(A).
The modern name for Benthamite Utilitarianism in neoclassical economics is SEU theory(Subjective Expected Utility).Therefore,a microeconomic foundation based on Utility Maximization is just Benthamite Utilitarianism updated with modern mathematical techniques.Milton Friedman was a major advocate of SEU.
Keynes rejected Benthamite Utilitarianism as a very special case that would only hold under the special assumptions of the subjectivist,Bayesian model-that all probabilities were additive,linear,precise,single number answers that obeyed the mathematical laws of the probabiity calculus.
Keynes specifies his conventional coefficient of risk and weight,c, model in chapter 26 of the TP on p.314 and fotnote 2 on p.314,as a counter weight to the Benthamite Utilitarian approach.
Essentially, Keynes's generalized model is given by
c=2pw/(1+q)(1+w),
where w is Keynes's weight of the evidence variable that measures the completeness of the relevant, available evidence upon which the probabilities p and q are calculated.(Benthamite Utilitarians assume that the value of w is 1.)w is an index defined on the unit interval between 0 and 1,p is the probability of success,and q is the probability of failure.p+q sum to 1 if they are additive.This requires w=1.Keynes's c coefficient can be rewritten as
c=p [1/(1+q)][2w/(1+w)].
Now multiply by A or U(A).One obtains
cA= p[1/(1+q)][2w/(1+w)]A.
The goal is to maximuze cA or cU(A).The weight 1/(1+q) deals with non linearity.The weight 2w/(1+w) deals with non additivity.
It is now straightforward to see that the neoclassical microfoundations assume that all probabilities are additive and linear.This is nothing but a special case of Keynes's generalized decision rule to maximize cA,or cU(A),as opposed to the Benthamite Utilitarian pA or neoclassical pU(A).It is now clear that Keynes had created general theories of macroeconomics,probability,and decision making.Keynes's accomplishments,once understood,place him as the only rival to Einstein for the title of the greatest scientist of the 20th century. Economists have only a very vague,hazy understanding of Keynes 's distinction between risk and uncertainty .
The conclusion is very straightforward.Libertarian economists , like Friedman and Hayek ,uses the rule to Maximize pU(A)either explicitly or implicitly.Keynes used the rule to maximize cU(A).This is the same type of rule used by ambiguity averse decision makers.
Summary of How Markets Fail: The Logic of Economic CalamitiesBehind the alarming headlines about job losses, bank bailouts, and corporate greed is a little-known story of bad ideas. For fifty years or more, economists have been busy developing elegant theories of how markets work?how they facilitate innovation, wealth creation, and an efficient allocation of society?s resources. But what about when markets don?t work? What about when they lead to stock market bubbles, glaring inequality, polluted rivers, real estate crashes, and credit crunches?
In How Markets Fail, John Cassidy describes the rising influence of what he calls utopian economics?thinking that is blind to how real people act and that denies the many ways an unregulated free market can produce disastrous unintended consequences. He then looks to the leading edge of economic theory, including behavioral economics, to offer a new understanding of the economy?one that casts aside the old assumption that people and firms make decisions purely on the basis of rational self-interest. Taking the global financial crisis and current recession as his starting point, Cassidy explores a world in which everybody is connected and social contagion is the norm. In such an environment, he shows, individual behavioral biases and kinks?overconfidence, envy, copycat behavior, and myopia?often give rise to troubling macroeconomic phenomena, such as oil price spikes, CEO greed cycles, and boom-and-bust waves in the housing market. These are the inevitable outcomes of what Cassidy refers to as ?rational irrationality??self-serving behavior in a modern market setting.
Combining on-the-ground reporting, clear explanations of esoteric economic theories, and even a little crystal-ball gazing, Cassidy warns that in today?s economic crisis, conforming to antiquated orthodoxies isn?t just misguided?it?s downright dangerous. How Markets Fail offers a new, enlightening way to understand the force of the irrational in our volatile global economy.
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