 |
Dragon Days: Time for "Unconventional" Tactics by H. John Poole
Book Summary InformationAuthor: H. John Poole Foreword: Ray L. Smith Illustrator: Mike Leahy Edition: Paperback Audio: English (Original Language); English (Unknown); English (Published) Published: 2007-10-10 ISBN: 096386954X Number of pages: 484 Publisher: Posterity Press
Book Reviews of Dragon Days: Time for "Unconventional" TacticsBook Review: International Law Enforcement thru Unconventional Tactics Summary: 5 Stars H. J. Poole, in DRAGON DAYS, turns attention to beating our opponents in "The War on Terror". His basic approach is to enforce International Law utilizing Unconventional military techniques.
First, Poole addresses the question of whether or not the Red Chinese are involved in promulgating terror. Given that Afghanistan is proximal to its border, and that Pakistan has been a long time ally against its traditional foe India, Chinese involvement with Islamic radicals may well reflect their regard for their own interests. From a strictly national perspective, the Chinese are cogent to counter increasing U.S. and Indian influence in their own back yard. While radical Muslamic terrorists have their own agenda, Chinese involvement may not be based on ideological concerns. Indeed, a total U.S. disaster may mean that the Chinese won't receive a return on money borrowed from it by the U.S.(!)
The "War on Terror" - is it a military struggle - or International Law enforcement? Here, Poole is on solid ground recommending, in the second section of his book, that the U.S. and its allies approach terrorism in a law-and-order context. A relevant illustration is a recent event in Indonesia: after a night club bombing that claimed the lives of several western tourists, as well as Indonesians', the Indonesian authorities brought the radical Islamic perpetrators to trial and subsequent conviction. Though largely a Muslim nation, Indonesia wasn't rocked by civil unrest after the terrorists were convicted.
The techniques profiled in Poole's book are similar to those the TV viewer can find on "CSI" type programs. Poole rightly compares how a criminal case is pursued by the NYPD versus how a U.S. military unit would respond to a similar incident in Afghanistan or Iraq. Civil authorities in the "Big Apple" - and their elected representatives holding national office - would be justly outraged over military operations in New York City as these are conducted routinely in the Mid-East. Repercussions for such conduct would be swift - and career ending.
International terrorism is a breach of International Law. When the international terrorist is regarded as the equivalent of the serial rape-murderer, rather than the representative of a just cause, all societies, Western, Eaastern, Muslim, developing world - all societies will pursue his elimination. Trial by World-recognized judicial authorities, based upon forensic evidence with internationally-agreed upon validity, is the surest means to undermine any moral authority of the terrorist.
When Poole discusses small unit tactical operations, he is on his own turf in the final section of his book. While one may question his political analyses, there is no denying his experience and post military career tactical studies. The sources of Poole's tactical craft are Asian in origin. He relies heavily on North Vieetnamese/Viet Cong, Japanese Ninja and North Korean "Light Infantry Bureau" sources in his depiction of appropriate techniques, even providing the outline of a training program on "unconventional warfare".
Poole holds that U.S. "Special Operators" need a different direction in their tactical techniques, and that these unconventional skills should be promulgated to the level of the common infantry units. He stresses the significance of tactical finesse at the squad level versus the large-unit operations favored by the U.S. Military establishment. He decries the unnecessary reliance upon technology and firepower at the expense of good field craft and tactical skills. While the applicability of his touted "flying column" assault may be questioned, the tactical competence required to execute it is one the U.S. ground forces should definitely seek to achieve.
More astute readers may pay closer attention to Poole's focus on China's role and debate its applicability. There is room for a wide dispersion of viewpoints on these matters. Poole has presented his conclusions. Others may agree or disagree with him. His discussions in the tactical realm will doubtless draw more criticism: many western-inluenced military enthusiasts will, no doubt, decry his approach to "unconventional tactics". Certainly the U. S. Military establishment's predilection for hi-tech and lots of firepower aren't reflected in Poole's techniques.
However, two aspects are to be noted: 1) The current conflict in Central Asia and the Mid-East call for a much more sophistacated law enforcement-cum-light infantry approach, especially when operating among a civilian population. Enraging this population is counter productive; and, as has been noted by other observers, the U.S. forces cannot "kill their way" out of their tactical problems. 2) If only at the outset of their employment, Poole's recommended "Unconventional Tactics" may just succeed, simply because our current foes would never expect a tech-heavy, firepower-reliant U.S. force to fight in such a manner.
Summary of Dragon Days: Time for "Unconventional" TacticsWithin Dragon Days are two studies: (1) how a rising superpower may be hiding its Maoist expansion behind Islamic insurgency; and (2) what America's armed forces must do to curtail either. Ostensibly, that power also provides foreign aid to the regions affected. But, the "corporations" involved are little more than extensions of its army. Thus, much of the Free World may be at risk. The U.S. military is ill-prepared for so subtle and widespread a confrontation. Instead of blatantly occupying countries or training their armies, it must start to deploy tiny teams of "foreign-aid workers in the law enforcement sector." Then, by the thousands, specially trained U.S. infantry and special-operations squads could anchor widely dispersed "Combined Action Platoons." Their mission would be to help sister squads of indigenous police and soldiers to reestablish local security. Without that local security in contested areas, there can be no viable counterinsurgency effort or operating democracy. Part Two of the book shows what participating GIs must know about criminal investigative procedure. Part Three contains the unconventional warfare (UW) "tactical techniques" (like football plays) they will need. The latter are new to the literature and not covered by any U.S. manual. They should allow tiny contingents of Americans to slip away unhurt whenever they get cut off or surrounded. Without this new capability, their only hope would be massive bombardment in, or forceful extraction from, a heavily populated area. Such things do little to win the hearts and minds of a population. This book provides the training and operations blueprint for winning an unconventionally fought world war. It also points to a hidden adversary.
|
 |