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Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F. by Stefan Aust, Anthea Bell
Book Summary InformationAuthor: Anthea Bell, Stefan Aust Edition: Hardcover Audio: English (Unknown); English (Original Language); English (Published) Published: 2009-03 ISBN: 0195372751 Number of pages: 480 Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
Book Reviews of Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F.Book Review: Bad Company Summary: 5 Stars
The Baader-Meinhof Group, Rote Armee Fraktion, Baader-Meinhof Gang or RAF, depending on your age and political persuasions, was a relatively small but very high profile terrorist group which was primarily active from the late 1960s through the late 1970s, although it did not disband (officially) until the late 1990s (circa 1970-1998 to be more precise). Like its American analogue, the Weather Underground Organization, it exercised influence disproportionate to its size and the scope of its revolutionary program. The source of the enduring interest in these groups is speculative but seems to be largely attributable to the romance associated with their "outlaw" activities and the extreme nature of their armed actions. There is no better, more comprehensive, objecctive or more readable source of information on the RAF than Aust's newly revised history.
Unsurprisingly, as with any political group, terrorist or otherwise, the RAF cannot be understood outside the context of social, political and economic milieu from which it arose. That context, in this case, was the "counterculture" that arose from the intersection of the much reviled Vietnam War, the anti-colonial uprisings in Africa and Algeria, the revolution in Cuba, the civil rights movement, appearance of idealistic, self-sacrificing revolutionaries such as Che Guevara and the generational reaction to the myriad constraints imposed by the "old" order. In other words, it is almost inconceivable that the RAF could arise in present day Germany or the EU, nor could the WUO develop in the current-day U.S.
Clumsy governmental repression of dissident movements coupled with the inherent contradictions and hypocrisy of a state claiming the mantle of a modern, liberal democracy while failing to deal either the legacy of the Third Reich or the presence of ex-Nazis (active in both government and industry) lubricated the birth of the RAF and similar groups (Revolutionary Cells and 2 June Movement, for example). The flash-point for the formation of the RAF seems to have been the brutal police repression of a student demonstration against the visiting Shah of Iran and the murder of a student, Benno Ohnesorg (by an East German-affiliated police agent of the West German State).
To put it bluntly, the political program (such as it was) of the RAF was not especially sophisticated. In response to the Ohnesorg murder, Ensslin observed, "They'll kill us all. You know what kind of pigs we're up against. This is the Auschwitz generation. You can't argue with people who made Auschwitz. They have weapons and we haven't. We must arm ourselves!" A bit overwrought perhaps but essentially accurate. Meinhof, the voice of the RAF, in an unusually taciturn statement of purpose noted, "The Red Army Faction's Urban Guerrilla Concept is not based on an optimistic view of the prevailing circumstances in the Federal Republic and West Berlin". It seems the group's ideology never progressed much past this stage of development. Additionally, while it had a certain cachet with student groups and some intellectuals, their message never resonated with the German public.
Once the foundational members of the group, Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhof, Gudrun Ensslin, Jan-Karl Raspe, Holger Meins, Horst Mahler and Irmgard Moller were confined to Stammheim Prison, the exclusive focus of the RAF became that of liberating the prisoners. This involved the kidnapping of the "arch-captialist" Hanns-Martin Schleyer and the hijacking by a particularly odious "affiliated", Third World (Palestinian) "revolutionary group" of a Lufthansa jet. Parenthetically, Scheleyer, like many of his contemporaries, was an unsympathetic type who was redolent with the stench of a Nazi past, one which was never renounced, formally or otherwise. The German government, having by this time transformed the country from an imagined into a genuine surveillance society replete with a substantial covert police monitoring apparatus, refused to exchange the prisoners for fear of setting a precedent. Baader, Raspe and Ensslin killed themselves (Moller attempted suicide but failed; Mahler had been expelled from the group; Meins died during a prolonged hunger strike; Meinhof fell by her own hand at an earlier date). A German paramilitary unit rescued the Lufthansa hostages. Schleyer, the former Hitler Youth, SS Lieutenant and current representative of "the Establishment" was killed by "second generation" RAF members. The "German Autumn" of 1977 came to a close and, by and large, so does this book.
The major deficiency of Aust's otherwise excellent history is the total lack of references: not a footnote, not a single book, article or any other trace of source material can be found. This is particularly paradoxical in that the publisher is the revered Oxford University Press. Given the recent revelations (by Scott Horton, published in "Harpers", February, 2010) on the probable murders of 3 "war on terror" prisoners held by the U.S. Government at Guantanamo Bay and the subsequent, bungled cover-up, parallels to the RAF "Death Night" at Stammheim Prison are inevitable. Lamentably, for this and other reasons, while there is a concluding section to the book, it makes no effort to integrate the RAF into the general context of terrorist groups or governmental responses to them, past or present. Further, Aust does not provide a post-script on the fate of the surviving members, some of which he obviously interviewed for the book. Regardless, Aust wastes no words, perhaps reflecting his training as a journalist: his presentation makes for tense reading.
Lenin's adage that "Politics equals war minus bloodshed" was ever only applicable to groups operating according to the social contract of bourgeois democracies; it never applied to the radical cadres of the far-Left (or far-Right, for that matter). This was well understood by the RAF, whose murderous policies convincingly demonstrated that for them, "Radical politics is war plus bloodshed". They further proved that the equation of violent provocation of the government equals increased repression of the public is true, but the further equivalence that government repression yields a radicalized public is, at least in Western consumerist societies, false. Indeed, this approach did nothing but further extend the public's mandate for policies that facilitated general surveillance, infringed on civil liberties, suborned extra-judicial measures and made "the masses" even less receptive to change, that being either for better or for worse. Does this sound familiar? It should.
Summary of Baader-Meinhof: The Inside Story of the R.A.F.Book Description The Baader-Meinhof Group--later known as the Red Army Faction (RAF)--was a violent urban guerilla group which terrorized Germany in the 1970s and '80s, killing 47 people, wounding 93, taking 162 hostages, and robbing 35 banks--all in an attempt to bring revolution to the Federal Republic. Stefan Aust's masterful history of the Group presents the definitive account, capturing a highly complex story both accurately and colorfully. Much new information has surfaced since the mass suicide of the Groups' leaders in the 1980s. Some RAF members have come forward to testify in new investigations and formerly classified Stasi documents have been made public since the fall of the Berlin Wall, all contributing to a fuller picture of the RAF and the events surrounding their demise. Aust presents the complete history of the RAF, from the creation in 1970 to the breakup in 1998, incorporating all of the new information. For instance, there is growing evidence that the German secret service eavesdropped on Baader, Meinhof, and the other RAF members imprisoned in Stammheim and that they knew that the terrorists planned a mass suicide, but did nothing to prevent it. Also, there is new information about the role of the RAF lawyers (among them Otto Schily who later was Minister of the Interior in Gerhard Schroder's cabinet), and the roles of the different RAF members and the rivalry between them. The volume will also contain numerous photos. Terrorism today is never far from most people's thoughts. Baader-Meinhof offers a gripping account of one of the most violent terrorist groups of the late twentieth century, in a compelling look at what they did, why they did it, and how they were brought to justice. Questions for Stefan Aust Q: Given your background as an editor of Konkret and your previous friendship with Ulrike Meinhof, how was the original version of your book received by the left when it first came out? Though you did not explicitly state it at the time, your book very conclusively seemed to demonstrate that the strange deaths in Stammheim prison were in fact suicides, yet it seems to be an article of faith amongst leftists that Baader, Ensslin, and Raspe were murdered. How was your book received by the left at the time? And has that changed with the new edition, especially now that you clearly state that their deaths were suicides? A: When the book first came out in 1985, a lot of copies were being bought by RAF members who were sitting in jail. Some of them learned about the first generation of the group mainly by reading the book. But that didn?t stop them--or their sympathizers--from being very critical of it. On a talk show, Hans Christian Ströbele, who was a former RAF lawyer and later a member of parliament (Green Party) said that Baader and Meinhof would roll over in their graves if they read the book...After more than twenty years, I now have the feeling that even people from the left see the book as a rather fair and correct work of journalism. Now their main argument is that the book has the Deutungshoheit about the subject--which means something like opinion leadership about the subject of RAF-Terrorism. Q: There are many of people who romanticize the leaders of the RAF without understanding the devastation that they wrought. The Baader-Meinhof Complex, the Oscar-Nominee movie that you wrote last year, was accused of glorifying terrorism. What are your thoughts about those criticisms? Is there even a way to portray the Baader-Meinhof saga without being accused of glorifying or romanticizing terrorism? A: The moment you write or make films about groups like the RAF you support their immorality. I wanted to portray this group as accurately as possible. It would be impossible for a book reader or film viewer to understand why so many people followed them if they were portrayed only as villains and criminals. It was their charisma that made them so dangerous. One of the reasons why we showed the group?s bombings and killings in such detail was that we wanted to explain what terrorism really is: the terror and killing of people--of human beings--not of lifeless character masks. The aim was to make viewers understand why people of such high moral standards turned into ruthless killers, how hyper moral turned into immorality. Q: Do you see any homegrown, leftwing terrorist movements taking root in Europe or America again? One of the reasons that the Baader-Meinhof Group was able to rise to prominence early in the 70?s was partially because of ineffective police work. It seems that in the modern climate, particularly since 9/11, it would be extremely hard for any band of urban revolutionaries to wage a similar war without being quickly caught. Do you agree? What kind of left-wing radical movement COULD succeed? A: Any kind of terrorist activity is always a part of a bigger radical movement. A terrorist group can evolve only when a bigger radical movement of any kind exists--left, right, nationalist or religious. Organizations like al Qaeda can only function from inside a global Islamist movement. Similarly the RAF was a part of the radical left in Germany, at least in the beginning. And only if this terrorist group is imbedded in a major movement can it have enough supporters to operate for a longer period of time. The members of the RAF were mainly arrested because normal people--even leftists--called the police. The enormous buildup of the police and the security agencies in Germany could not have been as effective without the cooperation of the people. The only way for a left-wing radical movement to succeed is by using the power of convincing the people rather than employing violence of any kind. Q: The single hardest concept for an American living in the early 21st century is to understand is the notion that the members of the RAF felt that by attacking the state and having the state respond with massive retaliation, that there would be an enormous number of German people who would then take up their cause and overthrow the state. It just seems utterly delusional, especially coming from clearly intelligent people. How could they get to the point where this seemed rational? A: I can only quote Ulrike Meinhof who often said ?wie kommt die Dummheit in die Intelligenz?? which means ?how can stupidity invade intelligence?? The first mistake the RAF made was not seeing reality. For me the whole struggle from the very beginning of my research was to realizing that the RAF had a quasi-religious character more than a rational political character. To think that in Germany the masses would overthrow the capitalist system was completely irrational. I cannot believe that they really believed that. Rather, they acted like political or religious martyrs to show that the state was as brutal as they thought it was. It was an experiment with their own--and others?--lives. Q: What was Ulrike Meinhof like as a person before going underground? Reading her Konkret essays in chronological order, one is struck by how much more hardened, desperate, and humorless she became in her later columns. Was she like that in her personal life? Did she have fun and socialize? Did she seem like she had an internal conflict? A: Ulrike was a very impressive person. She was well-educated and could get her point across very convincingly. At the same time she was quite an intolerant individual who thought she knew things better than others... However, people of the liberal movement adored her, and she socialized a lot during her time in Hamburg and with Konkret, where at this time she wrote about the poor, about people in sweat shops and in prison. In the end she could not live in these two worlds. When she went to Berlin she grew more and more depressed. Ultimately, I think her involvement in the RAF was due to many personal and psychological reasons. Read more
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